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City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 85, 124 P.3d 203  
(Dec. 15, 2005)1 
 
EVIDENCE – AFFIDAVITS 
 
Summary  
 
 This case analyzes the scope of NRS 50.315(4), which allows the submission of 
an affidavit to prove specific facts about blood testing by experts. The scope of the 
affidavit was challenged as well as the Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront 
witnesses against him.  
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court held that the information contained in the affidavit 
did not exceed the scope of the statute. 
The court also held that the affidavit is considered testimonial in nature and would 
be barred under Crawford v. Washington, but statutory requirements may waive the right 
to confront so long as the statute adequately protects the defendant’s right to confront. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Defendant Mike Gehner was charged with misdemeanor driving under the 
influence. The City submitted an affidavit from the nurse that withdrew Gehner’s blood 
for testing, which stated all of the information required by NRS 50.315(4). Gehner argued 
that the contents of the affidavit exceeded the scope of the statute, and that the nurse’s 
statement that no alcohol swabs or solutions had been used was inadmissible. Instead, 
Gehner wanted to call the nurse as a witness to ask her if any alcohol swabs or solutions 
had been used, which was already stated in the affidavit. 
 The municipal court agreed with Gehner’s argument and struck out portions of the 
affidavit and required the nurse to testify. The City then filed a writ of mandamus seeking 
the District Court to compel the production of the affidavit. The District Court agreed 
with the municipal court’s finding and denied the petition. 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
  
 Gehner argued that the affidavit exceeded the scope of the statute and that the 
submission of the affidavit denied him the right to confront witnesses under Crawford v. 
Washington.2 
 
                                                 
1 By Laura Deeter 
2 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
Statutory Interpretation 
 
 To interpret the statute the court looked at the plain language of the statute and 
legislative history to determine the legislative intent.  The statute states that an affidavit 
by a person who withdraws a sample of blood for analysis by an expert is admissible to 
prove certain facts.3  Those facts include the occupation of the declarant, the identity of 
the person from which the sample was taken, the fact that the declarant had the sample in 
their sole custody or control and that it was in the same substantial condition, and the 
identity of the person that the sample was delivered to.4 The court also looked at 
subsection eight of the statute, which allows for the Committee on Testing for 
Intoxication to adopt regulations for the form of the affidavit.5  
The regulations create an ambiguity as to whether the Legislature intended the 
affidavits to be narrow and cover only what is prescribed in NRS 50.315(4) or whether 
the committee can broaden the scope of the affidavit. The legislative history showed that 
the statute was created to prevent unnecessary appearances and testimony from 
healthcare professionals when the defense had no questions for cross-examination.  In 
addition, the legislature looked at a sample affidavit which contained the same 
information about the use of alcohol based swabs and solutions. The Legislature knew 
such information may be included and left it to the discretion of the committee. Calling 
the nurse to testify would be contrary to the legislative intent and would not foster 
judicial economy. 
 
Confrontation Clause 
  
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives 
defendants the right to cross-examine witnesses against them.6 Under Crawford, a 
testimonial statement by a witness who does not appear at trial is inadmissible, unless the 
witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the witness about the statement.7  A testimonial statement is an ex-parte in-court 
testimony or equivalent, such as an affidavit.8 The test is whether an objective witness 
would reasonably believe that the statement would be used later in court.9 The affidavit in 
question was created to be used in court and prevent health care officials from having to 
testify, and would qualify as a testimonial statement which would be inadmissible under 
Crawford. 
 However, the Nevada Supreme Court held in DeRosa v. District Court10 that 
Confrontation Clause objections are waived by failure to comply with statutory 
procedures.11 Under NRS 50.315(6) and (7) the defendant must establish before trial that 
there is a substantial and bona fide dispute of the facts stated in the affidavit and it is in 
                                                 
3 NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.315(4) (2004). 
4 Id. 
5 City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 84 at 5. 
6 Id. at 7.  
7 Walsh, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 85 at 8, citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 985 P.2d 157 (Nev. 1999). 
11 Walsh, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 85 at 9, citing DeRosa, 985 P.2d at 163. 
the best interest of justice that the witness who signed the affidavit be cross-examined.12 
The defendant failed to raise the necessary objections required by statute and waived his 
rights under the Confrontation Clause.  If there is no bona fide dispute as to the facts of 
the affidavit there is no reason to bring in a witness who will not be cross-examined, and 
the statute sufficiently preserves the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. 
 
Conclusion  
 
 The court reverses the judgment of the district court and grants the writ of 
mandamus compelling the production of the affidavit and directs the municipal court to 
determine whether Gehner waived his confrontation rights. 
                                                 
12 NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.315(6)-(7) (2004). 
